Biometric attendance & identity
Tap card plus fingerprint. The card is bound to one person, so it cannot be passed to a friend at the gate.
Schools and HR teams both have the same problem with card-based attendance: a card can be handed to someone else, so a tap only proves the card was present, not the person.
- 01
An RFID/NFC reader paired with fingerprint smart cards that match the fingerprint on the card itself — no fingerprint data ever leaves the card or reaches a server.
- 02
A tap-and-match flow: first tap of the day checks a person in, the second checks them out, and the card refuses to unlock without the correct enrolled finger.
- 03
A reader agent, built with a swappable driver interface so future reader hardware isn't a rewrite, running as a background service and posting taps to a cloud backend.
- 04
The backend resolves a card to a specific, named person and logs any unrecognized card as unassigned for an admin to register — the credential is bound to one person by design.
- 05
Designed from the start as an API-enabled identity platform, so schools, colleges or HR systems can integrate against it rather than being locked to one interface.
Real interfaces, not mockups.
Match-on-card, not match-on-server
The fingerprint sensor and the two stored templates live on the card's own firmware — the card itself refuses to report a valid tap until the correct finger is presented. The reader and backend never see or store biometric data at all; they only see a UID that has already been authorized by the card. That split is what makes the card impossible to share: possession of the card alone proves nothing.
fingerprint match, nothing sent to a server
Something similar to build?
Tell us what you run today and where the manual work sits.